10-858

6 February 1958

MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence

SUBJECT

: Views of the Senate Foreign Relations Committee

on the Mansfield Bill

Relations Committee, the following may serve to refresh your memory concerning the views of that Committee on the Mansfield Bill. Of the eight Democrats, seven--Green, Fulbright, Humphrey, Mansfield, Morse and Kennedy--were all co-sponsors of the bill and voted for it. The other two Democrats--Sparkman and Long--were both absent on official business and so recorded. On the Republican side of the Committee, only one of the seven voted for the Mansfield Bill and that was Langer of North Dakota.

2. Of the Democrats, only Morse spoke on the floor of the Senate in favor of the Mansfield Bill. Morse spoke more often than any other Senator in favor of the bill, with the exception of Mike Mansfield himself. Langer spoke three times in favor of the bill, while Knowland and Hickenlooper—on the Republican side—spoke against it. The gist of the remarks of these five Senators are enclosed.

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Lyman B. Kirkpatrick Inspector General

cc: DDCI

Manafield had the floor approximately 33 times in the course of the two day debate. We kept atressing that Congress and the American people were being kept in ignorence of what CIA did. We suggested that CIA's position of responsibility to none but the Mational Security Council should be changed. He asked how many requests for meetings of the CIA subcountttees had been made on each side. He repeatedly stated that he thought there was a serious question about the arrogation of authority by the Emecutive Eranch of the Government. Manafield cited several instances which he termed violations of the intent of Congress by the Administration in handling appropriations. He said he thought the President had set up his Board of Consultants two days before the Manafield Bill was to be considered by the Rules Committee as a method of heading off the Bill. He pointed out that the President's Board was responsible to the Executive alone and lacked the legal authority of a Congressional inquiry. He stated that CIA was the only major Agency over which Congress exercises no direct and formal control.

Manafield said the four subcommittees have no staff to rely on. He pointed out that the President's Board will be part time only and will make only pariodic checks, while he believed there was need for a continual check on "this Agency which seems to be expending continually." He cited the Meover Commission statement about the shortage of information on the Seviet Union and the need for internal administrative improvements in CIA.

Manafield stated that Gongress should not rely on a subsommittee but on a joint committee with regular standing. He said the staff would be subject to the highest security regulations, and although the Mill provided for \$650,000 for a staff, he said at one point that he would settle for \$25,000. We said the Consittee would defend CIA against unjustified attacks. We also indicated he would give up the word "all" in referring to CIA informing Googrees of its activities. We saked Senator Museall whether staff numbers were present when CIA testified and was advised that one staff number was present.

Manafield said that he felt Congress was entitled to as much information as the Bational Security Council or a private commission and stated that

Valter Bedell Smith was in Sever of the Bill and quoted a letter from

Clarence Francis, Chairman of the Countities for the Houser Report, suggesting the bill. He also said that the Houser Countesion recommended a joint Congressional consistes. He stated that CIA was doing everything in its power to defeat the Bill.

Langer spoke three times during the debate. He generally spoke in agreement of statements, particularly those by Senator Morse, and laid greatest emphasis on what he alleged to be secrecy for secrecy's sake. He also emphasized that the Foreign Relations Committee did not hear from CIA and were not advised by the other Committees of what they were told by CIA. He said he also worried about CIA's influence on foreign policy.

Morse had the floor approximately sixteen times during the debate. He raised the question of the relations between the proposed Committee and the President's Beard. He felt that the Committee would maintain a check on foreign policy as far as CIA was engaged in foreign policy. He implied that he had letters from people saying that CIA abroad was criticising United States foreign policy. He said he abhorred Government by secrecy and that a mistake by CIA in some tinderbox area of the world may cause a loss of millions of lives. He would want the Joint Committee to keep the Foreign Relations Committee, as well as the Senate as a Whole, informed.

Morse stated that he felt the present SIA relationship to Armed Services and Appropriations was voluntary and he wanted it mandatory. He said the Congress had not been insisting on exercising its powers to check the Executive Branch of the Government in many fields, including foreign policy.

Merse insisted that CIA's influence in foreign policy was probably great in affecting Executive decisions and that one of the reasons he favored the Committee was to find out in fact, not theory, exactly how much of a policy-waking role CIA does have.

Morse said the analogy between the CIA and the FBI was wrong insamuch as there were many checks on the FBI. He said he believed the way in which the American spy system worked should be known to all members of the Foreign Relations and Armed Services Committees. Herse said he thought the United States was most secure when there was full public disclosure to elected representatives. He said as a member of the Foreign Relations Committee he had never received information from the Armed Services Sub-

committees and that there should have been periodic reports. He said the Foreign Relations Committee should have information from CIA on what is going on in the world and added "a spy system, unless it is very rightly handled, can be a major cause of war."

Hickenlooper took the floor about four times to speak against the Bill.

His remarks were primarily as a member of the Joint Committee on Atomic

Energy and he said he thought there was no parallel between GIA and the AEG,

and enumerated the various points of difference, particularly the legislation

required by the AEC, the fact that it was engaged in business, and the

fact that the AEC operated domestically while GIA was primarily oversees.

He said that GIA should be given certain broad powers and authority subject

to the major supervision of the Executive Branch of the Government.

Moviend spoke about five times in opposition to the Bill, repeating mainly the reservations voiced by Saltonstall by contributing the fact that the President had grave reservations because of the effect of the Bill on the cooperative arrangements with the intelligence services of other countries.

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